POST /admin/tenant-kms/revert
Revert the tenant from BYOK back to a KnoxCall-managed (operator) master key. The inverse of onboarding: a new operator-wrapped master key is provisioned and activated, existing data is re-encrypted under it, and the customer KMS configuration is removed. Your KMS key itself is never modified — you can re-onboard BYOK at any time. Auth:Authorization: Bearer <session jwt> + X-Tenant-ID. Requires an owner/admin session.
This endpoint requires a recent step-up verification (re-authentication) performed within the last 2 minutes by the signed-in user (the same tight window as unseal — reverting removes your KMS revocation control over data-at-rest). No step-up header or token is sent on this request — the server checks for a recent, unused verification tied to your session. To create one, re-authenticate with a second factor, passing "action_scope": "tenant.kms" in the body: POST /auth/2fa/verify-step-up (authenticator-app code), POST /auth/passkey/verify-step-up (passkey, challenge from POST /auth/passkey/authenticate-options), or POST /auth/2fa/webauthn/verify-step-up (security key or passkey, challenge from POST /auth/2fa/webauthn/step-up-options). An emailed code does not satisfy this gate. GET /auth/step-up/status reports unscoped verifications only, so it does not show a tenant.kms one. If none is present, the request returns 403 with { "error": "Recent step-up verification required for this action", "requires_step_up": true, "max_age_minutes": 2, "action_scope": "tenant.kms", "allowed_methods": ["passkey", "2fa"] }.
The behavior depends on whether your KMS is reachable, which the server verifies with a live wrap/unwrap probe:
KMS reachable — lossless revert
The new operator-managed key is activated immediately and a background rewrap job re-encrypts all existing data under it. Your KMS configuration stays in place until the last row wrapped under your key has been migrated (it is needed to decrypt them), then is removed automatically.KMS unreachable — forced revert (data loss)
If the probe fails (revoked IAM grant, deleted role trust, disabled key), secrets written while BYOK was active cannot be re-encrypted and become permanently unreadable. The server refuses with409:
"path": "forced_data_loss" and "rewrap_lease_id": null. The KMS configuration is removed immediately and a snapshot of it is written to the tamper-evident audit trail — if you later restore KMS access, KnoxCall support can re-attach the configuration to recover secrets wrapped under the old key versions.
The tenant owner receives a security notification email, and a byok.kms.revert entry is written to the hash-chained critical audit log.